Evolved biocultural beings (who invented computers) by Barrett, Louise et al.
University of Lethbridge Research Repository
OPUS http://opus.uleth.ca
Faculty Research and Publications Barrett, Louise
2015
Evolved biocultural beings (who
invented computers)
Barrett, Louise
Frontiers Media
Barrett, L., Pollet, T. V., & Stulp, G. (2015). Evolved biocultural beings (who invented
computers). Frontiers in Psychology, 6:1047. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01047
http://hdl.handle.net/10133/4646
Downloaded from University of Lethbridge Research Repository, OPUS
OPINION
published: 22 July 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01047
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 July 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1047
Edited by:
Danielle Sulikowski,
Charles Sturt University, Australia
Reviewed by:
Michael Stirrat,
University of Stirling, UK
*Correspondence:
Louise Barrett,
louise.barrett@uleth.ca
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Evolutionary Psychology and
Neuroscience,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 29 April 2015
Accepted: 09 July 2015
Published: 22 July 2015
Citation:
Barrett L, Pollet TV and Stulp G (2015)
Evolved biocultural beings (who
invented computers).
Front. Psychol. 6:1047.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01047
Evolved biocultural beings (who
invented computers)
Louise Barrett 1*, Thomas V. Pollet 2 and Gert Stulp 3
1Department of Psychology, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, AB, Canada, 2Department of Social and Organizational
Psychology, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 3Department of Population Health, London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK
Keywords: evolutionary psychology, extended mind, cognition, culture, embodied cognition
Introduction
Many thanks to Bryant (2015) for keeping the conversation lively, and engaging in further debate
on our paper (Barrett et al., 2014). Although Bryant raises several interesting points, it appears that,
as with our previous commentators, there was some misunderstanding of our aim, which simply
was to answer the question posed for us: does evolutionary psychology represent an alternative to
computational theories of mind? To reiterate, we suggested that Santa Barbara-style EP could not
be an alternative given that it already is a computational theory of mind. Bryant (2015) apparently
considers this question ill-posed, given his assertion that viewing “the mind as a case of digital
computation” is “the only game in town.” Our friendly suggestion here is that perhaps he needs to
get out a little more, and sample more fully the alternatives on offer.
Not the Only Metaphor in Town
“Freud often compared the brain to hydraulic and electro-magnetic systems. Leibniz compared it to a
mill, and I am told the ancient Greeks thought the brain functions like a catapult. At present, obviously,
the metaphor is the digital computer.”
∼ John Searle
To assert that there is no alternative to digital computation is a philosophically weak position, not
least because the history of science provides ample evidence of prominent ideas eventually shown
to be wrong: phlogiston and the luminiferous aether were also “the only game in town” once
upon a time. The brain has been likened to many other cultural tools that were, unsurprisingly,
considered to be of great significance in their time; the computational metaphor is one in a long
line of metaphors that reflect the most advanced technology of their day. There is no reason to
imagine that we have finally managed to hit on the correct one, as opposed to the one that just
reflects something about the times in which we live (Barrett, 2011).
Our main point, though, is that digital computation really isn’t the only game in town.
Among other work cited in our original paper, Chemero (2009) provides the most recent and
comprehensive treatment of a non-computational-representational approach to mind (see also
Anderson (2014, 2015) for a more neuroscientifically-focused account that similarly concludes
the best way to understand the brain may be in enactive and ecological terms). Furthermore,
this approach is not restricted to philosophical theorizing but also includes empirical work
(see Dotov et al., 2010, as well as the examples given in Chemero, 2009). There have also
been earlier incarnations of a non-representational approach to cognition (e.g., Rosch et al.,
1992; Thelen and Smith, 1994; Kelso, 1997) along with Gibson’s (1979) anti-representational
theory of perception (see Barrett, 2011 for a review). Given Bryant’s (2015) assertion of no
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scientific alternative to computation, he implies either that
such genuinely non-computational-representational approaches
do not qualify as science, or else he has misunderstood
them. Although all we need do to counter Bryant’s position
is point to these scientifically credible alternatives, in what
follows we consider briefly some of the arguments against a
strong computational position. We then go on to discuss his
other assertions regarding the relationship between culture and
cognition.
It is telling that Bryant (2015) adopts a rather “Hegelian”
approach in his commentary (see Chemero, 2009, and our
original article), asserting the necessity of digital computation
and information processing (conceived in terms of Shannon
information theory: G. Bryant, Pers. Comm.), rather than
providing arguments or evidence for it. As Wallace (2007)
discusses, echoing Searle (1990) before him, the notion of the
brain as engaged in digital computation is not a scientific
discovery, like the moons of Saturn, but is instead a claim: a
claim that looking at the brain in this particular way is useful.
As Wallace (2007) argues, Shannon’s theory was a pragmatic
solution to an explicitly human engineering problem, and was
never intended as a scientific theory of cognition. Using Shannon
information to model human cognition is fundamentally flawed
because, as Wallace (2007) discusses, human cognitive systems
violate the assumptions under which Shannon information
applies. Wallace (2007) further notes that use of terms like
“information processing” to describe brain function can lead
to a dualist position. Such thinking pervades Klasios’s (2014)
commentary, for example, when he argues that EP deals only with
information processing and not neural activity as such, giving rise
to the brain possessing two distinct qualities: the material activity
of its neurons and, as Wallace (2007) calls it, the non-material,
“mysterious world of information.”
Bryant’s argument rests on the notion that adopting an
information theoretic view is, in essence, a functionalist
perspective, asking what role a given process plays, rather than
the specific manner in which it is brought about or implemented.
This is entirely reasonable—such a position has helped avoid
a particular kind of “neural chauvinism” that suggests there
is something inherently special about biological brains, so
excluding any form of artificial intelligence from consideration.
In addition, cognitive integration is often characterized as a
form of “extended functionalism” (e.g., Wheeler, 2010) precisely
because it attempts to expand the bounds of the cognitive system
beyond the biological brain. That said, it is also apparent that
understanding neural implementation is crucial to generating
well-founded hypotheses about brain function. Neurobiological
data are particularly useful for guiding evolutionary theories
by constraining our hypotheses with respect to what brains
can reasonably be expected to achieve (see Colombo, 2013 and
Peters, 2013). Bryant and Klasios both stick to the classical
cognitivist EP party line, justifying a strategy of studying the
computational-algorithmic levels alone, but we think that EP,
and evolutionary approaches more generally, would benefit from
using neurobiological data to inform their theoretical stance, thus
grounding our knowledge in living biological systems; we are,
after all, attempting to explain how such living biological systems
work. Such a stance is also a natural element of the embodied
perspective we endorse, which argues that the way brains are put
together will matter for cognition (that is, the way that neurons,
glia, neurotransmitters and neuromodulators actually go about
doing their job) and how adaptive behavior in the world is
generated.
From our perspective, then, it seems well-worth considering
the radical non-representational/non-computational alternative
proposed by Chemero (2009), as well as related work on cognitive
integration. As Chemero (2009) himself points out, and as
we acknowledged in our original article, embodied/dynamical
approaches do not entail a rejection of all representational
theories of mind. Clark (1997), for example, argues that there are
certain “representation-hungry” (i.e., linguistic) processes that
do not seem amenable to an account grounded in coordinated
sensorimotor processes alone. Thus, there is some effort
being made to reconcile embodied and dynamical approaches
with computational/ representational theories (e.g., Barsalou’s,
1999 “perceptual symbol systems” and Clark’s, 1997 “dynamic
computationalism”). At a minimum, however, the recognition of
alternatives to computational-representational theories of mind
make it possible to ask some penetrating questions about the
nature of representation in a computational model of mind,
and whether such representations are, in fact, doing all of the
cognitive work, all of the time (Barrett, 2011). Thus, when Bryant
(2015) asserts that cognitive integration is a computational theory
he is not wrong, but nor is he right. More specifically, the issue
of whether cognition is extended can be viewed as orthogonal
to whether cognition should be viewed as computation (see
Sutton, 2014): the issue at stake is where the bounds of the
cognitive system should be drawn, and whether bodily resources,
material artifacts, and other aspects of the environment can be
considered constitutive parts of the cognitive system or simply
causally related to them.We argued for the constitutive approach,
because this follows naturally from a radical embodied view that
treats cognitive processes as products of the interaction between
brain, body, and environment and not the brain alone (see also
Chemero, 2009; Barrett, 2011; Hutto and Myin, 2013). Even if
one wishes to adhere to a computational framework, however,
cognitive integration can and does represent an alternative
approach to standard cognitive psychology because it views
cultural artifacts (in the human case) and other environmental
resources as an integral part of cognitive systems (a point made
in both Barrett et al., 2014, and reiterated in Stulp et al., 2015);
cognitive integration does not view the brain alone as the part
that does all the heavy-lifting. To counter this, as Bryant (2015)
and Klasios (2014) do, simply by insisting that brains compute is
to precisely miss this point.
Loops, Not Arrows
Bryant (2015) also suggests that we have got our causal arrow
largely pointing backwards. According to Bryant, culture is
primarily shaped by our brains and bodies, and not vice
versa (although he then goes onto suggest something very
similar to our position where “the outputs of such processes
feedback iteratively into an evolutionarily dynamic cultural
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knowledge system,” which points to a tension—if not an outright
contradiction—in his argument). Of course, human brains are
involved in the creation and use of artifacts and other forms
of cultural representation, and hence brains must be involved
in the shaping of culture—this is not at odds with anything we
said in our original paper. The argument from the extended
mind, however, is that, by extending our cognition beyond the
biological brain, we become capable of feats that would otherwise
be impossible. Malafouris’ (2013) recent analysis of how physical
artifacts allowed us to make the transition from numerosity to
a formal concept of number and hence mathematics is another
good example (see also Menary, 2007). Our position, then, is that
we did not get the causal arrow backwards because there is no
arrow. Instead, there are loops of continual reciprocal causation,
with social activities and material culture both shaping and being
shaped by the brain in an ongoing cycle.
By seizing on our example of timeliness as ultimately reflecting
concerns about coordination and cooperation, Bryant (2015)
over-simplifies and trivializes our position. Perhaps we made
our point too flippantly. What we were attempting to convey
was the idea that, through our invention of hours, minutes, and
seconds, along with devices to measure their passing, our specific
concept of time as a fourth dimension (and so on through to
the concept of space-time that characterizes Einstein’s theory
of relativity), has fundamentally transformed aspects of human
thought and practice. There seems no way that our use of time
can be reduced entirely to the demands of social coordination
and cooperation. Indeed, it is interesting to note that both Basu
and Waymire (2006) and Mullins et al. (2013) make exactly the
reverse argument to Bryant (2015) suggesting that large-scale
human cooperation was dependent on material culture, namely
writing and record-keeping (although these authors argue that
this allowed us to “transcend” our evolved psychology, we would
suggest this represents an example of how human psychology
is inherently extensive and integrated with environmental and
cultural resources). Although timeliness could be a by-product
of social norms and customs as Bryant suggests, the concept of
time is not: our invention of various ingenious ways to measure
time and how we use these to shape our lives, permit us to
go far beyond anything that our Pleistocene ancestors were
capable of. Of course, humans are not “infinitely flexible and
unconstrained by past selection,” but one has to admit there
is something about the sheer inventiveness of modern human
behavior that quite clearly reflects the manner in which cultural
artifacts augment, enhance, and extend our evolved biological
brains.
Functional Fuzziness
Bryant (2015) identifies one last failing on our part concerning
the relationship between domain-generality and specificity, with
reference to our argument on incest taboos. Namely, he suggests
that we did not consider the possibility that unconscious
mechanisms guide our behavior under such circumstances. Far
from failing to acknowledge this, however, we citedWestermarck
(1921) in precisely this context. It is odd that Bryant picks
up on an aspect of our argument that was made explicit in
our original piece, but ignores its substance, which was to
counter the idea put forward by Cosmides and Tooby (1994)
that incest avoidance requires innate domain-specific knowledge
because such knowledge could not, even in principle, be learned.
Instead, Bryant attempts to shift the emphasis, making the point
that “just because a mechanism works across content domains,
it is still functionally specialized. The scope of a mechanism
is independent from whether it has design features.” To the
extent that we understand this statement, it seems to promote
a rather fuzzy notion of functional specialization, and deny
the very motivation for EP-style “design thinking” in the first
place: that is, the notion that specialized tasks require specialized
mechanisms, and cannot be solved effectively by general-purpose
mechanisms that apply across several domains. Such a statement
also raises an empirical worry for, if it is true that a mechanism’s
scope is independent of its design features, how does one go
about identifying evolved functionally-specialized mechanisms
applied to a new domain as opposed to evolved domain-general
mechanisms operating on one of the several tasks to which they
are well-suited? There seems to be no means of distinguishing
the two. Consequently, when Bryant asks: where is the argument
here? We would suggest that, not only is there an argument to be
had, but it is one that cuts to the very heart of the EP project.
Why All the Fuss?
Summing up, Bryant (2015) suggests the gap between human
behavioral ecology and EP is closing, but notes that Symons
(1987) question remains: if we’re all Darwinians, what’s all the
fuss about? For us, the fuss is about the rather restrictive view of
human psychology promoted by EP, and the failure of some of
its assumptions to withstand close scrutiny; a topic that occupied
two-thirds of our original paper. More broadly, we think it
is worth considering whether we should continue to base our
model of the mind on inanimate computation (a notion that
has human intentionality built into it at source) or whether we
should pursue a truly evolutionary route that grounds psychology
(of both human and non-humans) in living biological systems—
a view that further permits the study of humans as hybrid
embodied-extended biocultural beings who invent all kinds of
things and so continually reinvent themselves. For us, this is
another good reason why some Darwinians should continue to
make a fuss.
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